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INTRODUCTION
More than 450 million people worldwide suffer from neuropsychiatric disorders and the numbers
continue to rise (WHO, 2016). In 2010, aiming to solve the global mental health crisis and
advance psychiatry toward a precision medicine approach, the US National Institute for Mental
Health (NIMH) initiated the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013).
Scientists at NIMH importantly recognize that understanding and explaining psychopathological
phenomena requires input from different areas of science that investigate the role of different units
of analysis (e.g., genes, cells, systems) in the production of organism-level behavioral functions.
The RDoC matrix is put forward as a context for integrating results from these different sciences
into a taxonomy of putatively valid constructs they purportedly share in common. It is intended
to facilitate the development of “integrative psychobiological explanations” of those behavioral
functions designated by the constructs (Cuthbert and Kozak, 2013, p. 931; See also Sanislow et al.,
2010). Such explanations, by shedding light on the mechanisms of these functions, will enable
investigators to pinpoint viable targets for therapeutic intervention in cases in which these functions
are disrupted.
The RDoC project is still in its infancy and its proponents recognize that it has much room
for improvement (Casey et al., 2014). To date, it has been criticized for being “braincentric” and
decontextualizing mental disorders from their bodily, social, and environmental contexts (e.g.,
Whooley, 2014; Bernard and Mittal, 2015). Although proponents of RDoC claim that one of its
crucial aims is to integrate various areas of science, an obstacle to this integration is the lack
of construct stability in psychology and neuroscience. In this article, I explain why stabilizing
constructs is important to the success of the RDoC initiative and identify one measure for
facilitating such stability.
THE RDoC MATRIX
The RDoC Matrix consists of a table in which findings from psychology and neuroscience may
be organized. Five broad domains of behavioral functioning are identified in the rows of the first
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of different areas of science contributing collectively to construct stabilization, which facilitates explanatory
integration and the development of integrated valid constructs. Some examples of current RDoC constructs are identified in the figure in plain typeface.
Constructs currently not represented in the RDoC matrix and others to be added are identified in boldface.
column of the matrix: (1) positive, (2) negative valence systems,
(3) cognitive, (4) social processing, and (5) arousal/modulatory
systems. A selection of constructs designating some behavioral
functions currently under study across psychology and
neuroscience are identified and classified under one of each
of the 5 domains. For example, attention, perception, declarative
memory, language, cognitive control, and working memory are
classified as cognitive systems. Negative valence systems include
the constructs of acute threat, potential threat, sustained threat,
loss, and frustrative nonreward. Each construct is also given a
general definition. Inmost cases, these definitionsmake reference
to neural, psychological, and behavioral processes associated
with the construct. For example, fear is characterized as
involving “activation of the brain’s defensive motivational system
to promote” protective behaviors (i.e., neural processes), “a
pattern of adaptive responses to conditioned and unconditioned
threat stimuli” (i.e., behavioral/psychological processes) and
possibly “internal representations and cognitive processing” (i.e.,
psychological processes) (http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-
priorities/rdoc/constructs/acute-threat-fear.shtml).
The columns of the matrix reflect the fact that research
on domains of behavioral functioning spans multiple levels of
organization from genes to cells to networks to behavior and
includes multiple different areas of science (e.g., psychology,
systems neuroscience, and neurobiology). An additional column
labeled “paradigms” is where experimental paradigms, standard
procedures for producing, detecting and measuring behavioral
functions that correspond to the constructs in the matrix,
are placed. The Stroop Task is an experimental paradigm
historically used to investigate selective attention in human
subjects. Fear-conditioning paradigms, in contrast, are used to
study fear in humans and non-human mammals.
How will RDoC facilitate progress in understanding
disturbances in behavioral functioning? Investigators working
in those sciences represented in the matrix use experimental
paradigms to produce, detect and measure instances of
behavioral functions that correspond to RDoC constructs.
The constructs are essentially labels that are linked up with
(1) experimental paradigms used to investigate the behavioral
functions designated by those labels and (2) units of analysis that
have been implicated in the production of behavioral functions
designated by those labels. Although proponents of RDoC
remain vague about the details, at some point research findings
inputted into the matrix are supposed to result in integrative
psychobiological or mechanistic explanations that describe
the physical components and processes that bring about the
functions designated by RDoC constructs (Cuthbert and Kozak,
2013). Knowledge about mechanisms is in turn supposed to
foster the development of therapeutic interventions in cases
in which behavioral functions are disrupted, with the aim of
restoring normal functioning in those individuals.
OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION
We should not expect integration to be an emergent feature of
the juxtaposition of a mass of research findings emanating from
psychology and neuroscience. The explanatory and conceptual
integration that RDoC is supposed to deliver instead requires
intensive collaborative efforts on the part of investigators
working in areas of science that investigate RDoC constructs.
To understand why, a closer look at explanatory, conceptual
and investigative practices in psychology and neuroscience is
relevant.
Explanations in psychology have been characterized as
explanations by functional analysis (Fodor, 1968; Cummins,
1983). These explanations involve ascriptions of functions to
organisms and the abstract identification of the sub-capacities
that bring these functions about without regard for anatomical,
structural, biochemical, or physiological facts about the brain and
nervous system. They often consist of box-and-arrow diagrams
where boxes stand in for psychological capacities and arrows
represent information flow through the system from stimulus
inputs to behavioral outputs. An explanation of attention by
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 309
Sullivan Stabilizing Constructs across Research Fields
functional analysis, for example, may describe a “short term
storage” system that receives information from the periphery
and sends it through a “selective filter” that determines what
information is received by systems downstream (Broadbent,
1958). Explanations in neuroscience, in contrast, are described
as mechanistic insofar as they identify the physical parts (e.g.,
systems, cells, molecules) and processes (e.g., activation, firing,
phosphorylation) that realize organism-level functions (Craver,
2007; Bechtel, 2008). Part of a mechanistic explanation of
attention, for example, may describe activation of dopamine
receptors and depolarization of medium spiny neurons in the
nucleus accumbens of the basal forebrain.
A prerequisite for integrating explanations by functional
analysis with mechanistic explanations is “connectability”
(Nagel, 1961). More specifically, the terms designating cognitive
capacities in an explanation by functional analysis must have
roughly the same referents as the terms designating cognitive
capacities in a mechanistic explanation. To refer back to
the previous example, an explanation by functional analysis
that contains the term attention ought to refer to the same
phenomenon as a mechanistic explanation that contains that
term. Terms designating cognitive capacities are the common
denominator between the two forms of explanation and
satisfying the connectability condition requires that the terms
designate the same thing. Otherwise, rather than explanatory
integration, terms in one area of science are eliminated and
replaced with those of another.
The RDoC task forces implicitly realize that satisfaction of the
connectability condition is required for explanatory integration,
as is evidenced by the fact that they have sought to deploy
strategies to stabilize RDoC constructs, while simultaneously
acknowledging that the constructs are heuristics that may
warrant revision in light of future discovery (Cuthbert and Insel,
2013). However, stabilizing constructs requires more than a small
group of investigators selecting a set of terms that are used across
different areas of science and providing them with definitions
broad enough to accommodate different uses of these terms. As
RDoC’s creators acknowledge, it is not a project that will prove
ultimately successful if it isolates itself from those very sciences
poised to shed light on the kinds of questions it is designed
to answer (e.g., Simmons and Quinn, 2014). RDoC’s success is
instead contingent on a large-scale revolution in the mind-brain
sciences to collectively stabilize constructs so that conceptual
and explanatory integration are possible. One component of this
revolution has to be coordination across investigators working
in the same and different areas of science to come to specific
agreement about (1) how to define terms designating behavioral
functions, (2) what the best experimental paradigms for studying
a given behavioral function are, and (3) when two experimental
paradigms may be said to produce, detect and measure roughly
the same function.
Do we encounter such coordination within or across
psychology and neuroscience currently? Let’s begin by
considering cognitive psychology. One of its paradigmatic
features is the importance placed on engaging in rigorous
task analyses to determine the component cognitive processes
operative when subjects are trained and tested in experimental
paradigms. This ought to mean that intra-lab strategies are
in place to ensure that experimental paradigms measure
the functions they are intended to measure, which ought to
contribute positively to construct stabilization. While this
is true, inter-lab practices are not necessarily conducive to
stability. For example, two investigators may be interested
in investigating the same function, but disagree about the
most suitable task for this purpose. Since stimuli and task
demands may differ radically between tasks, it is difficult to
determine if the same component cognitive processes are
involved in each task and whether they measure the same thing
(Sullivan, 2009; Lilienfeld, 2014; Lilienfeld and Treadway, 2016).
Investigators often disagree about which component cognitive
processes are involved in a task and the behavioral data often are
compatible with multiple different explanations by functional
analysis.
Although we may be optimistic that cognitive neuroscience
will provide the fMRI or other brain data requisite for
resolving such problems of underdetermination, it has its own
troubles with respect to construct stabilization. Many cognitive
neuroscientists do not aim to identify the component cognitive
processes thought to be engaged in experimental tasks nor to
determine how the variables manipulated in an experiment affect
these processes (Sullivan, 2014a,b). In fact, when evaluating or
comparing tasks it is more common for investigators to rely on
“intuitive judgments” about the processes involved rather than
look to “formal theories from cognitive psychology” for guidance
(Poldrack, 2010, p. 149).
We also find rampant methodological pluralism in those
areas of cellular and molecular neuroscience that investigate
cognition and behavior. Individual researchers vary experimental
paradigms and protocols used to produce, measure and
detect behavioral functions. Yet even subtle differences
in experimental protocols can impact the mechanisms
productive of those functions, prompting uncertainty as to
whether different laboratories are investigating the same
phenomenon. In some cases, investigators may be unclear what
function they are discovering the mechanisms of (Sullivan,
2010), but given that they do not regard understanding
component cognitive processes as relevant to their mechanistic
explanatory goals, they see no need to look toward psychology
for guidance.
CONCLUSION
If construct instability across psychology and neuroscience
is as pervasive as these facts about practice suggest, then
stabilizing them for the purposes of conceptual and explanatory
integration is going to require scientists engaged in research
relevant to investigating the domains of functioning identified
in the matrix—including research on domains currently and
problematically absent from the matrix, like motor functions
(Bernard and Mittal, 2015)—to interact with each other in the
trenches to do hard work (Bilder et al., 2013). To date, RDoC has
pointed to large-scale meta-analyses as a primary way forward.
However, insofar as meta-analyses abstract away from conceptual
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and experimental practices operative within and across different
areas and laboratories in psychology and neuroscience, they will
not yield valid constructs. Details about features of individual
experiments matter for comparing data across laboratories and
determining if the same capacities are under study and the same
mechanisms are operative. While amassing discordant evidence
under a set of common labels may result in testable hypotheses it
will not directly shed light on real divisions in the causal structure
of the world.
RDoC’s success requires instead deliberate efforts across
the relevant sciences and humanities to collectively stabilize
its constructs (Figure 1). One plausible way forward is to
create networks of investigators representing a diverse array
of perspectives on behavioral and psychological functions
and regularly bring them together to facilitate discussions
about what the relevant constructs are, how to investigate
them, how to stabilize them, and related issues (See for
example http://www.rotman.uwo.ca/events-2/rethinking-the-tax
onomy-of-psychology-conference/). This is the RDoC model on
a larger scale and with greater inclusivity, but only by means
of broader collaborative efforts may we hope to ensure the
realization of RDoC’s positive aims.
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